Understanding positioning is a central concern for strategy. We offer a rich, but tractable, formalization of competitive positioning that is explicit about how the success of firms' policy choices in the face of competition is impacted by the multiple attributes along which firms can create value for consumers. On the supply side, our theory incorporates multiple organizational design choices; on the demand side, it incorporates heterogeneous buyers with preferences over multiple product attributes. Critical parameters are the extent of trade-offs firms face in setting attribute levels and the degree of interactions among organizational design decisions. We use a value-based approach to characterize competitive interactions in the marketplace. In contrast to classic arguments by Porter, we find that increasing the extent of trade-offs can increase the number of viable competitive positions that can be occupied in an industry, and thereby reduce the need for choice. In contrast to prior work on NK models of rugged landscapes, we find that increases in policy interdependencies among design decisions (i.e., increases in K) can decrease the number of viable competitive positions, and thereby reduce heterogeneity in competitive positions in an industry. Finally we use our model to examine the well known, but under-conceptualized, notion of 'stuck in the middle' positions, and characterize the extent to which the Porterian claims regarding competitive disadvantage hold.
Introduction
Competitive positioning is a central concern of the strategy literature. At the level of an individual firm, positioning entails a choice of how to compete in the market. At the level of an industry, a key question is the extent to which a given environment supports heterogeneity in competitive positions and hence in the associated organizational forms. Porter (1985, 1996) emphasizes that it is the existence of organizational trade-offs across multiple performance attributes (e.g., cost versus quality or ease of use versus features) that gives rise to the need for firms to make clear positioning choices. Despite being a central topic in the practice of strategy, competitive positioning has rarely been studied in an analytic way in the strategy literature, possibly due to the breadth and integrative nature of the phenomena. A complete treatment of positioning involves organizational design in the presence of trade-offs and interdependencies, consumer demand in the presence of multiple performance attributes, and competitive interactions in the market place. We seek to provide a parsimonious model of competitive positioning that captures all of these key elements.
Two of the most influential received representations of firm positions are productivity frontiers and rugged landscapes. In a productivity frontier (Figure 1a ), firm positions are represented as a point in a two-dimensional space (e.g., Saloner et al. 2001:61; Porter 1996:62) .
Textbook depictions of the frontier show a smooth trade-off between the two dimensions.
Positions inside the frontier are inefficient in that both attributes can be improved upon by moving to the frontier. Porter's (1996:61) asserts that moving to the frontier is an operational matter and that strategy is about the choice of a position on the frontier.
In a rugged landscape (Figure 1b) , firm positions are represented as a vector of organizational policies that determine an overall fitness level (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Ghemawat, 2010) .
At the heart of this representation is the degree of interaction among discrete policy choices.
The greater the interactions, the more rugged the landscape in that there is a greater number of local peaks. In the strategy literature, this representation has most frequently been used to study search by boundedly rational agents that can get trapped on inefficient local peaks.
The rugged landscape representation, which focuses on the choice of specific business policies, offers a powerful way to formalize the important organizational element of positioning (e.g., Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) . However, the use of a unidimensional measure of fitness means that the landscape approach does not explicitly encompass critical elements of positioning. In particular, many positions are characterized not by a single performance metric, but by performance on multiple attributes. Conversely, the frontier representation explicitly incorporates multiple attributes, but is silent on the underlying choices of business policies. Both approaches lack explicit consideration of consumer choice and competitive interactions. 1
We develop an approach to positioning that exploits the strengths of both the landscape and frontier representations. We develop a parsimonious model of how business policy choices influence performance on multiple attributes that matter for value creation. Our formalization parameterizes both the degree of trade-offs among the attributes and the degree of interaction among the policy choices. We incorporate consumer choice and competitive interactions using a value-based strategy approach (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996, 2007; Macdonald and Ryall, 2004 ) that allows for an explicit link between value creation and value capture.
We ask three main questions: (1) How is the degree of heterogeneity among firms competing in an industry determined? In particular, how does heterogeneity vary as a function of the extent of trade-offs between attributes and the degree of interdependence among business policy choices? (2) How does firm heterogeneity in positions translate into performance differences in terms of market shares and profits? (3) What drives the extent to which competitive outcomes are consistent with Porter's 'stuck in the middle' characterization?
Three unexpected results emerge from bringing together the various elements of competitive positioning in a unified analytic framework. Firstly, while the extent of trade-offs between attributes are critical for positioning, in contrast to a Porterian perspective, there may be less need for choice when trade-offs are great. Secondly, an increase in the interdependence among business policies may decrease rather than increase heterogeneity in competitive positions when there is a multi-attribute landscape. Thirdly, the widely cited 'stuck in the middle' effect (Porter, 1985) may be explainable in terms of a mechanism that does not depend on coherence among activities, but rather on purely market-driven arguments.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a modeling approach that allows addressing the questions of the paper, Section 3 illustrates the mechanics of the model by working out an example, Section 4 describes the main results, and Section 5 concludes.
Model

Landscape Models and Positioning
The NK modeling methodology (originally developed in evolutionary biology (Kauffman, 1993) ), has been widely adopted in the strategy literature to model the effects of search by boundedly rational actors (see for example, Rivkin 2001; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow 2007; Csaszar and Siggelkow 2010; and references therein) . A distinctive advantage of this methodology is its ability to formally model organizational concepts (such as bounded rationality, modularity, organization design, and analogical thinking) that are central to the current understanding of strategy, but that were not amenable to rigorous analysis using industrial organization approaches.
A weakness of the NK methodology is that it has mostly developed as a line of thought that does not intersect with industrial organization approaches, as the great majority of NK models do not delve with issues of competition, such as market share, concentration, and profits (Baumann and Siggelkow, 2010) . A notable exception to this lack of interrelation is the work by Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin (2006, 2007) , which, combining an NK model with a Cournot model, has made novel predictions regarding the relationship between industry profits and the potential for interdependency among activities, as well as offered an alternative causal explanation for industry shakeouts.
A characteristic of the NK models used in the strategy literature is that they measure performance in a unidimensional scale called 'fitness' (a name reminiscent of the biological origins of the model). Although this translation from biology to strategy leads to a straightforward interpretation of fitness in terms of firm performance (e.g., profits), it prevents the model from being used in settings where performance is multi-dimensional. Imposing that performance is unidimensional has profound implications, as multidimensional spaces are fundamentally different from unidimensional spaces, and hence, it is unclear how the predictions of the NK models in strategy would scale up to settings where performance (and not just policy choices) is multidimensional.
While in a unidimensional world, 2 is always above 1, in a multidimensional space it is unclear if, say, (4, 2) is preferable over (2, 4). An ordering relationship only exists when a point is superior to another in all of its dimensions (e.g., (4, 4) is superior or 'dominates' (2, 2)). The fact that the ordering relationship is not well defined leads to sets of equivalent points.
This fundamental topological difference between uni-and multi-dimensional spaces has important implications for strategy, as many realistic competitive settings are indeed multidimensional. For example, the car industry competes in terms of prices, safety, mileage, etc., while the search engine industry competes in terms of comprehensiveness, usability, response time, etc. Moreover, it is the lack of a well defined ordering relationship in multidimensional spaces what makes the concept of positioning meaningful. More concretely, it is because a product with characteristics (2, 4) is not clearly above a product with characteristics (4, 2), that it makes sense to ponder questions such as which one of the two to offer, or whether or not it makes sense to come up with product (3, 3).
Our Modeling Approach
To account for the multidimensional nature of competition-a characteristic well captured in a metaphorical sense by the frontier representation (e.g., Figure 1a )-we modify the NK model to be able to deal with multiple dimensions, by assuming that any given position has multiple fitness values associated to it (one for each dimension). Fitness values correspond to the performance levels that firms are able to achieve along each of the dimensions. On the demand side, we are explicit that there is heterogeneity among consumers as to the relative weight they place on performance level of a given offer (e.g., Adner, 2002; Adner and Zemsky, 2006) . Value creation is thus a function of both a firm's policy choices as well as the distribution of consumer preferences in the market.
To deal with the competitive interactions among firms we take a value-based approach (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Macdonald and Ryall, 2004; Chatain and Zemsky, 2007) .
This approach starts with an explicit characterization of the value creation possibilities of the players in an industry, where value is defined based on the gap that is created by the willingness to pay (WTP) of buyers and the opportunity cost of production (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) . In our theory, the value that is created in a transaction depends on the position of the firm, and on consumer preferences over the attributes at that position in the landscape.
The value-based approach uses solution concepts from coalitional game theory to characterize value capture by the different players. The usual solution concept is the core (Edgeworth, 1881; Gillies, 1959) , which typically identifies a range of possible value capture levels for each player (Macdonald and Ryall, 2004) . The core, which assures that no subgroup of players can split off and obtain more value on its own, captures competitive interactions in the industry. The range of possible value capture incorporates the role of bargaining in partially determining industry outcomes. Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) introduce the intuitively attractive notion of added value, which is the extent to which a player's presence in an industry increases value creation. Added value places an upper bound on the value that a firm can capture.
Of particular interest in strategy research are actions and investments of firms that affect value creation possibilities prior to competitive interactions in the market. In our theory, we are interested in firm decisions about where to position on a multi-attribute landscape.
In such applications, the range of possible value capture given by the core does not yield a clear objective function for firms. We follow Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) and consider a bi-form game, which involves a first stage where players take actions that affect value creation and a second stage where value capture is determined. In the first stage of a biform game, player actions are characterized by standard non-cooperative game theory techniques from industrial organization like Nash equilibrium. The second stage uses the core to select a range of possible value capture, and then player expectations about their relative bargaining power yield a well defined objective function.
We follow Adner and Zemsky (2006) and Chatain and Zemsky (2007) and focus on a setting with two types of players, buyers and suppliers, where there are no interdependencies, and the competition for each buyer can be analyzed independently. Thus we abstract away from effects like network externalities and learning curves where the value that is created in one transaction affects the value that is created in another. In our setting, value capture has the attractive property of being proportional to a firm's added value (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007) .
For the first stage of the biform game involving firm entry and positioning decisions, we take a standard industrial organization approach involving free entry by a large number of potential suppliers. Any position that is occupied by a firm must generate positive value capture. Conversely, any position that is not occupied by a firm would not generate positive value capture were a firm to enter and position itself there. 2
Positions as Attributes and Underlying Design Choices
A competitive position is characterized by performance on key attributes that drive value creation in the market. Textbook examples of two-attribute settings are cost and quality in hotels (Saloner et al., 2001:61) and computing power and battery life in laptop computers (Spulber, 2004:218) . We denote the level of an attribute i as a i .
As in many real settings, managers in our model do not have continuous dials to select attribute levels directly. Rather, attributes are determined by numerous underlying organizational and product design choices (e.g., a hotel manager cannot control 'customer comfort'
directly, but rather to choose parameters such as room size, type of electric appliances, staff to passenger ratio, etc.). We represent these decisions by a vector s of N binary design choices,
i.e., s = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) where s j ∈ {0, 1}. The design choices could relate to organizational design or to product design. For example, in the context of the strategy consulting industry, organizational design choices could be whether or not a consulting firm is organized as a partnership, and whether or not it offers implementation support in addition to advice. In the context of the automobile industry, the product design choices could be whether or not a car has anti-lock brakes, and whether or not it has four-wheel drive. Every distinct design gives rise to a different possible positioning in the industry, and hence there are 2 N possible positions.
Attribute levels are a function of the underlying design choices, i.e., a i (s), s ∈ {0, 1} N .
In specifying each of these functions we follow the NK methodology (Levinthal, 1997) . This methodology, widely adopted in the strategy literature (see for example, Rivkin, 2001; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007) , creates random landscapes of a size determined by parameter N , and a degree of interactions or 'ruggedness' that is determined 2 One critique of the use of the core in standard value-based analysis is that it involves a very high level of rivalry (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Chatain and Zemsky, 2009 ). In our model, the high level of rivalry implies that firms avoid head-to-head competition and locate in different positions. While it is possible to soften competition in a value-based approach (Chatain and Zemsky, 2009 ), this would require introducing fixed cost of entry to limit the number of firms in a given position. Such fixed costs, however, would complicate the analysis by introducing the possibility of multiple outcomes for a given landscape. Mathematically, each attribute function is defined as
and thus, each attribute can take values between 0 and 1. In this paper we focus on the case where there are two attributes, a 1 and a 2 .
The Extent of Trade-offs
In many settings the value of the attributes may exhibit trade-offs where increasing the level of one attribute necessitates decreasing the other. For example, the size of a car is usually negatively correlated to its fuel efficiency. Porter (1996:69) emphasizes that 'tradeoffs are essential to strategy. They create the need for choice and purposefully limit what a company offers.' We can capture strong tradeoffs between attribute levels by imposing that the contribution functions for the second attribute are perfectly negatively correlated with the contribution functions for the first attribute:
Perfect negative correlation is a strong assumption and in many settings one would expect that attribute levels would only be imperfectly correlated. Indeed, some attributes might be largely independent like the appearance and fuel efficiency of a car. We introduce imperfect correlation by varying the number of contribution functions that are linked across attributes. We define an overall measure of correlation ρ = Q/N for the case of positive correlation and ρ = −Q/N for the case of negative correlation. Thus, ρ can take on any value from −1 to +1. For ρ = −1 we have that a 2 (s) = 1 − a 1 (s), for ρ = 1 we have a 2 (s) = a 1 (s) and for ρ = 0, we have that a 1 (s) and a 2 (s) are independent. The parameter ρ will be useful for presenting our results.
Value Creation
We take a value-based approach to modeling market interactions. Such an approach starts with a precise statement of the set of actors in the industry and their value creation possibilities. Let S set denote the set of competitive positions occupied by firms. In addition, there are a finite number of buyers who vary in their preferences over the two attributes. We parametrize preferences with α ∈ [0, 1]. The set of buyers is given by A ⊂ [0, 1].
We follow Chatain and Zemsky (2007) and consider a setting where value creation possibilities are independent across buyers. Thus, we are abstracting away from considerations such as network externalities and learning curves. Value creation is increasing in both Attribute 1 and Attribute 2 and depends on consumer preferences. In particular, buyer α served by firm j at position s j ∈ S leads to a value creation of
where c is a constant marginal cost of production, v 0 is a constant in the consumer's WTP and the term α log(a 1 (s)) + (1 − α) log(a 2 (s)) captures the effect of attributes and preferences on the willingness-to-pay (WTP). We simplify the analysis by assuming that v 0 ≥ c so that value creation is always positive. 4
Each buyer wants at most one product and hence we have that the value created for buyer α by firms occupying the set of positions S, is simply the value created by the most suitable firm for that buyer:
Value Capture and Market Shares
The second step in a value-based analysis is to characterize value capture. We consider a biform game (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007) , which given our assumptions on value creation involves each firm capturing a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of its added value (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007) .
Added value is the value created with a given player in the industry less the value created with the player not in the industry. Firm j's added value for a single buyer α is then
. A firm's total value capture Π j is then proportional to the sum over its added value for each buyer:
Implicit in this analysis is that a firm serves those buyers for which it creates the most value. We now make this explicit and define the market share for each firm j. Let I j (α, S)
4 There is an analogous formulation where Attribute 2 reduces marginal costs rather than increasing WTP, such that the frontier maps the tradeoff between cost and quality (e.g., Porter, 1996) . In particular, a model with marginal costs given by c − log(a2(sj)) and WTP given by v0 + α 1−α log(a1(sj)), has the same set of viable positions and market shares as the model studied in the paper.
be an indicator of whether firm j has added value for buyer α and hence serves this buyer:
The market share of firm j is then the fraction of all buyers that firm j serves:
where M = |A| is the number of buyers.
Thus, value capture and market share at a position s j depends on the set of positions S occupied by its competitors.
Viability
We assume that a position is viable if and only if a firm located at that position has positive value capture. We denote by S * a set of viable positions, which must then satisfy
If
An important feature of our value-based model is that there is a unique set of viable positions.
Simulation
To analyze the model, we set N = 8 and run a simulation over the whole parameter space defined by K and ρ, namely, we vary K from 0 to 7, and ρ from −1 to 1 (in 0.125 increments, which given that N = 8, is the minimum increment allowed by the definition of ρ). This led to 136 (= 8 × 17) scenarios, and we run 50, 000 simulations per scenario. Apart from N = 8, we also tried the simulation with other values of N (6 and 10), and consistent with the NK literature, in broad terms, the results were not be sensitive to the choice of N , but rather to the relative size of K with respect to N .
We assume that consumers are uniformly spread over the [0, 1] range. Because the model combines simulation (the NK landscape generation) with closed-forms (the competition in terms of added value), it is convenient to use discrete rather than continuous distributions, thus we assume that there are M = 1000 consumers equally spaced in the [0, 1] range. If M is large enough, for all practical matters the discrete approximation leads to the same results as a continuous specification. Consistent with this, we found that results were not different in robustness tests where we set M = 500.
We also set λ = 1 and v 0 = c. The first assumption (λ = 1) influences firm profits by a scaling factor that affects all firms equally, and thus do not affect the interpretation of the results. The second assumption (v 0 = c) also affects all firms equally, and does not affect consumer choice (which is done in comparative terms), or profits (which are proportional to value added, which is defined in terms of a difference in value between the best and the second best firm for a given customer). The only case, in which assuming that v 0 = c is consequential is when there is only one product that dominates all others. In this case, assuming that v 0 = c underestimates the profits of this monopoly firm (as its value added is computed against the absolute zero, and not against another firm). In other words, our estimation of monopoly profits is conservative (which may be a realistic assumption given that monopoly profits are usually constrained by non-market means). In any case, given that the focus of our analysis is in establishing relative ordering relationships (as opposed to absolute numeric predictions),
and that under our current conservative assumptions, monopoly firms are already located in a 'corner' of our results, our conservative bias does not materially influence the results.
Understanding Positioning on a Multi-Attribute Landscape
The role of this section is to illustrate our analysis of positioning on a multi-attribute landscape. We start with a given set of possible positions and then identify the efficient and viable positions. For each of the viable positions, we then identify their market share and value capture. These mechanics are important for understanding the main results of the paper, which characterize patterns in these variables over a large number of such landscapes.
We illustrate the analysis for the multi-attribute landscape given in Figure 2a, 
Results
We use our model to explore how attribute correlation and policy interdependence impact key strategic variables in a multi-attribute world. We start by examining the topology of the competitive landscape, and then examine the implications of this topology for market structure, i.e., the distribution of market shares and profits in the industry. We conclude by examining the market share and profitability of specific positions and by revisiting the 'stuck in the middle' hypothesis.
The starting point of our analysis is to identify the number and relative distribution of the different positions that exist within the landscape. We distinguish between (a) inefficient positions that lie within the frontier, (b) positions that lie on the efficiency frontier, and (c) positions on the frontier that are viable in the face of rivals positioned elsewhere on the frontier. In doing so, we are explicit in accounting for how the presence of rivals affects competitive outcomes.
Efficient Positions
As shown in Figure 3 , we find that overall, the number of efficient positions is decreasing in Recall from Section 3 that the efficient points are those that do not have any points to their northeast. When ρ = 1, and all positions lie along the line that extends upward from the origin at a 45 degree angle, it is only the single point furthest from the origin that is efficient.
In contrast, when ρ = −1, the positions extend downward at a −45 degree angle, such that no single position lies to the northeast of another. As ρ values approach 0 from both directions, such that there is less and less correlation between the attributes, we find a shift from the linear distributions at the extremes towards an increasingly nebulous distribution. Points that lie within this 'cloud' are dominated by a few points on its upper right edge. These points on the upper right edge define the efficiency frontier (shown as solid black points in Figure 4 ).
Figure 3 also shows that the number of efficient positions is decreasing in policy interde-
6 Note that as we dial attribute correlation down from +1 we depart from the single attribute landscape found in standard NK models. As we dial up from −1 we depart from the strongest form of tradeoffs. pendence (K). This is due to the fact that as K increases, the variance in the fitness values of a landscape decreases (Altenberg, 1997) . In our two-attribute space, this means that the variance in the fitness values on both a 1 and a 2 decrease, and hence it becomes less likely for a given position to 'stand out' from the cloud, as this requires achieving a high fitness value on both dimensions simultaneously. 7 Thus, when performance depends on two fitness values, a vast number of niches are 'dominated,' or fall inside of the efficiency frontier.
Viable Positions
The viability of a position is determined by its ability to attract customer demand even if the other efficient positions are occupied. The number of viable positions, can be interpreted as capturing the extent of firm heterogeneity that a given industry can support. Figure 3 (and the data underlying the plot, which is presented in Appendix A) reveals that at ρ = 0.75 and ρ = 0.875 the ordering of the three lines is reversed by a small amount (i.e., the K = 1 line appears just below the other two lines). This non-monotonicity, is due to a geometrical property of high ρ clouds. To illustrate this phenomenon, imagine a ρ = 1, K = 0 cloud (i.e., a perfectly upward sloping straight collection of points, as for every s, a1(s) = a2(s)). If ρ is decreased by one notch, then the aspect of the cloud becomes that of two parallel lines (because by Equation (1), a2(s) must now be equal to either a1(s) − c ) is the one contribution function that is different between a1(s) and a2(s)), and it can be shown that there is a high probability (in fact 50%) that two parallel lines will lead to just one efficient point. On the other hand, if the same experiment is performed under higher values of K, the cloud of points looks less and less like a set of parallel lines, resulting in higher chance of producing more than one efficient point. positions is substantially lower than the number of efficient positions. This is reasonable, as the conditions for being viable are more stringent than for being efficient. In particular, a position that it is not close enough to the upper right edge of the cloud will not be able to capture customers, who will be better served by other, better located firms.
By clearly identifying the existence of viable positions, we follow Porter (1996) in showing that there are important positioning choices that must be made by firms even after they have reached the efficiency frontier. An overarching regularity is that the extent of tradeoffs increases the number of positions that can be supported in the landscape (i.e., the more negative ρ, the more viable positions). In practical terms, this suggests that when tradeoffs are high, choosing a positioning becomes a more elaborate decision, as there will be more viable positions from which to choose. Similarly, we find that concentration increases with K, consistent with the reduction of viable positions that was found to accompany an increase in policy interdependence (shown in Figure 5 ). 8
To better gauge how heterogeneous are the firms competing in a given market, Figure 7 explores what we call the 'market shares at the extremes,' which is the sum of the market shares of the first viable position at top-left plus the last viable position at the bottom-right of the efficient frontier. Interestingly, we find significant heterogeneity across positions.
Whereas the Herfindahl index in Figure 6 increases monotonically with attribute correlation (ρ), Figure 7 shows a richer relationship: the positions that lie at the extremes of the frontier capture a disproportionate share of sales throughout the range, creating a U-shaped profile.
At ρ = 1, there is only one viable position, and hence it holds the entire market. At ρ = −1, all the 256 positions are viable, but together the two extreme positions at the ends of the frontier capture well over half of the market.
The logic driving the large market share of the extremes, is that these positions do not The effect of ρ and K on profits becomes starker when we examine the heterogeneity in the profitability of different positions. As shown in Figure 9 , extreme positions capture an even greater share of profits than they do of sales. This figure follows the same general pattern as the market share on the extremes (Figure 7) : the positions at the extremes are able to serve a vast market without facing much competition, and thus are able to extract high profits.
Stuck in the Middle
Armed with our formal model we now revisit Porter's (1985:16) has been widely discussed in the past (e.g., Miller and Friesen 1986a,b; Hill 1988; CampbellHunt 2000 ; and references therein) we are not aware of any research having explored the 'stuck in the middle' hypothesis using a formal modeling approach.
Our finding on viability ( Figure 5 ) qualifies Porter's claims that in the face of tradeoffs firms must locate at the extreme points of the frontier (i.e., on his landscape in which cost and quality were the two dimensions, the only viable positions were 'cost leader' or 'differentiator'). In contrast, we find that as tradeoffs become more stark (i.e., ρ decreases), there is an increase in the number of niches in which a firm can sustainably locate in the face of rivals.
When we turn to market share and profits (Figures 7 and 9 ), however, we do find support for the warning against being 'stuck in the middle.' Firms at the extremes capture a disproportionate share of both sales and profits. However, the driver of these results is the firm's position relative to the location of rivals (due to the fact that the firms at the extremes can command monopolistic power over the corner of the market), rather than negative spillovers on 'corporate policy and culture' (Porter, 1985:18) or the lack of internal fit (Porter, 1996) .
In other words, we propose an explanation of the 'stuck in the middle' hypothesis that relies only on external fit arguments, rather than internal fit ones. Moreover, we qualify the stuck in the middle hypothesis, as we point out that its effect size should depend on attribute correlation (ρ) and consumer heterogeneity (the distribution of α).
Robustness
Apart from the robustness considerations and checks mentioned in Section 2.8, we also ana- 
Discussion
This paper introduces a parsimonious theory of positioning that considers both the interdependence of organizational policies, as articulated in the NK modeling literature, as well as competitive dynamics as articulated in value-based approaches to competitive analysis.
We examine how these factors interact in the context of a market in which consumers assess value creation along two different attribute dimensions.
Our investigation of positioning extends the literature in two critical ways. First, we incorporate multiple dimensions of value creation into our exploration of the fit between firms and their environments rather than abstracting to a single dimension. We show that introducing even just one additional attribute opens up a multiplicity of viable positions in the market. While a casual analysis might have supposed that shifting from one attribute from to two would allow the number of viable positions to double from one to two, we show that, depending on the extent of attribute relatedness (ρ), the number of viable positions can increase dramatically. This finding is enabled by our second point of departure-the explicit consideration of both consumer heterogeneity and product market competition. Our valuebased approach allows us to be explicit about the way in which a rival position in one part of the market affects payoffs in other parts. This addresses the call of Baumann and Siggelkow (2010) for analyzing how competition affects the landscape that firms must navigate.
Although each of these departures is straightforward, together, they give rise to a landscape whose topology is significantly different than that characterized by traditional singleattribute approaches. Using this structure, we are able to formally address a number of important strategy questions, such as: What drives the number of viable positions in an industry? What is the extent of heterogeneity in performance across these different positions?
And how salient is the threat of being 'stuck in the middle' ? Our answers to these questions are rooted in the interaction between the demand-side correlation between attributes, and the supply-side interdependence among policy choices.
Specifically, we are able to identify three unexpected results: (a) that the previously unexplored concept of attribute correlation (ρ) has a substantial impact on most of the competitive outcomes studied in the model; (b) that increases in policy interdependency (K) can decrease heterogeneity in competitive positions; and (c) that the widely cited 'stuck in the middle' effect may be explainable in terms of a mechanism that does not depend on coherence among activities, but rather on purely market-driven arguments.
Our explicit consideration of multiple attributes also allows us to revisit fundamental issues regarding landscape topology. The established NK literature has drawn attention to the important distinction between global and local peaks (e.g., Levinthal, 1997) . This distinction, however, has been made in the context of an environment defined by a single attribute dimension. That is, although there is a multiplicity of policy choices available to a firm, and each policy choice leads to a different fitness value, fitness outcomes are ordered along a single value dimension, and the (single) highest attainable value defines the (single) global peak. In our model, this corresponds to the case when ρ = 1, and the global peak corresponds to the single efficient position in the market, which is also the single viable position. In a setting with multiple attributes (and ρ < 1), in which different consumers tradeoff attribute performance in different ways (according to their specific α), the heterogeneity in consumer preferences gives rise to a multiplicity of efficient points, a subset of which is viable in the presence of competition. As we elaborate in Section 4, there is heterogeneity in the profit and market share that viable positions accrue, such that there is likely to be one viable point that is more attractive than the others. Although this point can be regarded as a true global peak, we show that the other viable points remain viable (i.e., firms in these positions have added value) even if the global peak is occupied, without need to resort to competition dampening mechanisms such as capacity constraints.
Our approach can be extended in a number of directions. Because we use a value based approach, which assumes high levels of competition, we do not allow for the possibility of inefficient positions being viable. Clearly, in a world with less competition, or imperfect information, such positions could be occupied profitably (see Chatain and Zemsky (2009) for ways to introduce imperfect competition). Future work could enrich our dynamics by, for example, introducing elements such as fixed entry costs (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007) .
Perhaps most interestingly, future work can explore how different search heuristics impact outcomes in a multidimensional landscape. Much of the research conducted using NK models in the strategy literature has examined how different modes of organizing local search yield different outcomes in the context of a single-attribute rugged landscape. It would be fruitful to explore how myopic search affects competitive outcomes on a multi-attribute landscape (e.g., the efficiency with which different modes of local search uncover viable positions), and how robustly well established results that have been developed within a single-attribute landscape hold up in a multi-attribute setting.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore dynamic responses to shifts in the landscape.
For example, to explore the repositioning of firms as the nature of tradeoffs in an industry changes, becoming more correlated (e.g., as services become more software-based, there is less of a tradeoff between features and cost), or becoming less correlated (e.g., as in industries that have 'traded up' toward luxury services, with a consequent increase in cost and quality).
Given that positioning is such a central concern for both strategy practitioners and researchers, we believe that furthering our understanding of its determinants and implications is worthwhile. This paper advances this agenda by developing a formal theory of positioning, bringing together notions of tradeoffs, interdependencies, heterogeneous consumer demand, multiple value attributes, and competitive interactions in a single, coherent, model. An important byproduct of taking a formal approach is that we are able to provide unambiguous definitions of important constructs (e.g., efficiency, viability, positioning), and relate these to the explication of meaningful strategic outcomes. Further, we are able to ground key notions that have become part of the strategy lexicon (e.g., the 'shape' of the technology frontier)
by deriving them from basic economic principles, and use these to posit clear mechanisms (i.e.,'how' explanations) connecting the inputs and outputs of the process of positioning. We hope that this approach can serve as a platform for future investigations of key questions in competitive strategy. 
